

HQ 9TH ADMINISTRATION COMPANY
ORGANIZATION ROSTER

1 Jun - 30 Jun 69

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Inclosure 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
15TH ENGINEER BATTALION 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

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21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for the Period
1 May 1969 to 30 June 1969.

Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-MH
APO San Francisco 96370

SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) INTRODUCTION:

a. The 15th Engineer Battalion is assigned as the organic engineer battalion of the 9th Infantry Division. The battalion headquarters is located at Dong Tam (XS415440), Republic of Vietnam.

b. The mission of the battalion is to provide combat engineer support to the 9th Infantry Division and to provide technical engineer advice and supervision.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION:

a. The battalion is currently organized under MTOE 5-155G. This organization became effective on 25 November 1968 per General Order Number 775, Headquarters, United States Army Pacific, dated 22 November 1968. As of 30 June 1969, the battalion had an assigned strength of 48 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 939 enlisted men. A request to augment the current MTOE was submitted on 4 January 1969. In addition to various proposed changes to subordinate company MDE's, the request included a proposal for authorization of a Flame and Security Platoon with an aggregate strength of 38 personnel. A Provisional Airboat Platoon with an aggregate strength of 34 personnel is now attached to the battalion under Department of the Army General Order Number 3334, dated 20 March 1969. The Flame and Security Platoon is presently operational, however the Provisional Airboat Platoon is now preparing to turn in its equipment in preparation for the Division's redeployment.

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b. The battalion (-) is based at Dong Tam while Company A (-) is located at FSB Moore (XS255503), Company C is located at Tan An Airfield (XS256557), and Company D (-) is located at Ban Tre Soccer Field (XS512316).

c. The Organizational Structure is attached as Inclosure 1.

d. The Roster of Key Personnel as of 30 June 1969 is attached as Inclosure 2.

e. The battalion TAOI is the same as the division TAOI.

3. (U) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Personnel: The replacement system and personnel management have continued to improve since the last report and are filling most of our needs despite the unpredictability of the enlisted procurement system. Several problem areas still exist, however. The availability of school-trained personnel in specialized MOS's continues to be of major concern to the command. Mechanics (63B), Supply Specialists (76YA0), Bridge Specialists (12U), Medical Specialists (94B), and Communication Personnel (30G and 31K) are the most critical. The nature and extent of this unit's mission do not allow time to depend on OOT to fulfill all the specialist requirements. At least some school-trained personnel are required to effectively accomplish our mission. A second problem area is the existence of very little, if any, overlap period for MOO's in critical positions. Much time and knowledge are lost when no time is provided to transfer information. A third problem is the officer rotational loss which will occur in the months of August and September. During this time sixty percent (60%) of the officers will rotate. If an infusion program is not given timely consideration, this command will be faced with the simultaneous loss of most of its key officer personnel. Since the announcement of the deployment to Hawaii by the 9th Division, all problems have become magnified. The August and September turnover will leave the battalion virtually void of officers until it arrives in Hawaii. The battalion will leave for Hawaii at less than half strength for enlisted personnel.

b. Rest and Recuperation: During the last quarter, allocations for centers such as Waipua, Singapore, and others were decreased and the allocations for Australia and Hawaii were increased. This was division wide in scope.

c. Liaison with Division AG Staff: The problem of timely receipt of orders has been solved by hand-carrying the request for orders to the personnel section. This accelerates the return of orders back to the battalion.

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d. Military Justice: Two special courts-martial, seven battalion level Article 15's, and twenty company level Article 15's were administered during the reporting period. Infractions involved AWOL, marijuana and drug abuse, and violations of off-limits directives. The Staff Judge Advocate has been of considerable help in the efficient administration of these matters.

e. Casualties: The 15th Engineer Battalion sustained a total of 7 wounded due to non-hostile action, 1 killed due to non-hostile action, 27 wounded due to hostile action, and 1 killed due to hostile action.

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Reconnaissance:

(1) By reorganizing the two reconnaissance teams into one, the S-2 section greatly increased its efficiency. This new method allowed the section to react to all situations without delay, since they could also provide their own security. With this concentration of experienced personnel, reconnaissance missions could be carried out in a quicker and more technically accurate manner, while new members of the section received valuable instruction in reconnaissance techniques.

(2) The reconnaissance team continued to maintain and up-date its records on roads and bridges in the division TAOI. During the reporting period, 665 kilometers of road were inspected; 575 kilometers by ground and 90 kilometers by air. Detailed reports were made concerning road and bridge conditions and presenting recommendations for their repair or replacement. These reports were made available to all units in the division, at their request. The section also continued its daily mission of the aerial reconnaissance of the main LOC's in the divisions TAOI. Approximately 1.75 hours of air time is obtained each morning so that a timely report can be made concerning the condition of more than 230 kilometers of the most heavily traveled roadways leading from the Solta to Saigon. Aerial reconnaissance enables the battalion to inform the division of road conditions by 0800 hours daily, and to expedite the interdictation of any interdictions that are observed.

(3) Due to the ever increasing need for accurate and up-to-date information, this section has made an exhaustive effort to increase its reconnaissance capabilities by coordinating directly with the other U.S and ARVN engineer units operating in the division TAOI. This program has been so successful that

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the section can now depend on almost immediate notification of any changes in road and bridge conditions. By informing other units in the division that the section maintains all the latest information on roads and bridges, many units now rely on this section for information concerning road conditions, bridge classifications, and enemy activity along the major LOC's in the Delta. We have been able to obtain additional information from divisional units by having them report to us when they have finished a mission in a particular area. The data compiled by this section has also aided the 579th Topographic Detachment in Long Binh with a means of updating their records and maps.

(4) This section has also been instrumental in providing technical assistance to many units operating in the divisions TAOI. On many occasions, the reconnaissance team has been requested to supervise the risk and caution crossings of heavy equipment on the many weak bridges in the Delta. Also, we have provided on the spot information to artillery units on the soil bearing capacities of proposed gun emplacements.

b. Intelligence:

(1) During the reporting period, the S-2 section has aggressively attempted to gather intelligence concerning road interdictions and the uses of mines and booby traps by the enemy. By working closely with the 9th Military Intelligence Detachment, the Division G-2, and the 7th ARVN Division G-2, we have accumulated a vast amount of data relating to each of these topics. Every effort has been made to disseminate this information to the troops in the field and to the various units and agencies that are working and using the roads in the division TAOI. The section has also questioned many civilians in an effort to gain useful intelligence. However, even with the help of the Voluntary Informant Program, only partial success has been obtained because of the hesitance shown by the majority of the civilians to become involved with Americans. The ICAP/MEDCAP effort has also met with limited success for this same reason. However, it has been found that the combined intelligence and medical program will achieve better results than most methods, since a feeling of good will is established with the Vietnamese civilians and they are more inclined to relate any information they may have.

(2) As the 1500 Engineers and other engineer units expand the road network within the division TAOI, the enemy has tried to stop construction by interdicting the new roads extensively. These interdictions range from the sophisticated cratering charges that demolish an entire stretch of road, to a simple roadblock composed

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of leaves and mud. This section has maintained a set of maps overlays with all interdictions plotted on it, in an attempt to identify enemy patterns. When a pattern is identified, the Division G-3 is immediately notified. Division G-3 may, in turn, employ a sniper team or some other means to deter enemy efforts of interdicting the roads.

5. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. General Employment:

(1) During the reporting period, the battalion continued to provide the direct combat engineer support required to sustain the division in its combat operations in the Mekong River Delta. The battalion participated in all major operations, with primary importance going to the conclusion of Operation Speedy Express (Dry Season Campaign) and the planning and initiation of Operation Rice Farmer (Wet Season Campaign). With the onset of the monsoon season, priorities have gradually shifted during the period from a pure construction effort to one of maintenance. The number of direct support combat missions has decreased over the period due to the fewer number of minesweeps required during the wet season and the emphasis placed on fire support base maintenance by infantry commanders. Except for a few exceptions, road and bridge construction has come to a complete halt and the effort directed towards maintaining the gains made during the dry season. Fire support base construction has continued with the main effort going into drainage, internal road repair, berm maintenance, and the waterproofing of bunkers.

(2) With the announced redeployment of the majority of the division's units from Vietnam, a drastic change in the priorities of engineer effort took place towards the end of the reporting period. Emphasis was shifted to the improving of the fire support bases in Long An Province for the 3d Brigade, which will be remaining in country. Particular importance was placed on the expansion of the facilities at the 3d Brigade base camps at Tan An Main and the Tan An Airfield, and the complete reconstruction of the fire support base at Can Giuoc. Work in both Binh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces has been greatly curtailed with only minimum essential maintenance work being accomplished. All extra construction materials are being gathered and transported to the construction sites in Long An Province. Also, buildings and bunkers at many base camps have been dismantled and the material is being collected for further use. As of this report, 60% of the battalions efforts are directed towards the construction in the 3d Brigade AO with more effort scheduled to begin soon.

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b. Headquarters Company: While continuing its normal mission of supplying and supporting the activities of the Battalion Headquarters and supporting the line companies with technical assistance and heavy equipment, Headquarters Company has recently taken the task of coordinating the battalion's redeployment activities. This has released additional men from the line companies for the construction effort in Long An Province. Again this reporting period, the Heavy Equipment Platoon has been primarily concerned with supporting the line companies in their road construction and land clearing efforts. The heavy plow blades have been completely abandoned for land clearing operations since their tremendous weight tended to get the bulldozers stuck in the mud as the rains rapidly decreased soil bearing capacities. The heavy lift capabilities of both the S-4 section and the Heavy Equipment Platoon have become increasingly critical during the reporting period. With the increased work load placed on both the cranes and forklift due to the division's redeployment, this equipment has been subject to more and more breakdowns. Only an increased maintenance effort has kept this equipment operational during this critical period.

c. Company A:

(1) The primary mission of Company A continues to be to provide direct combat engineer support to the division's 1st Brigade in Dinh Tuong Province. On a minor scale, the company has also provided technical assistance to units involved in construction at Dong Tam. Since the announcement of the division's redeployment, Company A has also supported the construction effort at the 3d Brigade's fire support base at Can Giuoc.

(2) Generally, Company A efforts have changed scope with the onset of the monsoon season. Emphasis was shifted from pure construction work to the maintenance of the roads and fire support bases constructed during the dry season and to the preparation of bunkers and other structures for the wet season. Combat demolition and booby trap clearing missions have been conducted in support of tactical operations, but these have greatly decreased in number. Minesweeps conducted on the roads within the 1st Brigade's TAOI has also been greatly reduced. As of the end of this reporting period, land clearing operations have been completely terminated.

(3) Fire Support Base Construction:

(a) Fire Support Base Moore (XS266507): Extensive improvements have been accomplished at FSB Moore during this period. These improvements provided some degree of comfort to

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the 1st Brigade Headquarters and other units that occupy FSB Moore. The vertical construction effort by Company A during the reporting period totaled 11,000 square feet of floor space. The construction included a new consolidated mess hall, a chapel, and indoor theater, eight new sleeping bunkers, and a new tactical operations center for the 3/39th Infantry Battalion. The existing structures continued to be repaired by Company A personnel whenever they were damaged by the weather or enemy fire. The berm was reshaped so that it would not be susceptible to erosion by the torrential rains. The berm was further stabilized by the planting and cultivation of grass on the berm. Positions for the .50 caliber machine guns on the berm were protected from the rain by the construction of simple, shed-type roofs. Seventy (70) concrete claymore foundations were constructed and placed around the berm to prevent tampering by the enemy. The engineers also supervised and aided in the construction of double apron, tangle foot, and triple concertina fences around the berm. With the onset of the rainy season, the entire drainage system within FSB Moore was repaired and expanded. Twenty-two concrete headwalls and eleven corrugated-metal culverts were constructed to replace damaged structures. All of the main drainage ditches were dug out and revetted to prevent erosion, and all secondary ditches were re-cut with a grader. The interior roads were also graded and covered with rock to stabilize them.

(b) Fire Support Base Duke (XS368448): Construction at FSB Duke continued this period with completion of eleven new sleeping bunkers, seven new fighting bunkers, and a shower facility. More than 500 loads of fill were hauled from local borrow pits to raise the elevation of the entire base, as well as to repair and elevate the berm. A completely new drainage system was constructed with culverts placed through the berm to carry out the excess water. Maintenance of FSB Duke was carried out on an on-call basis, since a permanent party of engineers could not be spared from other jobs.

(c) Fire Support Bases Schroeder (XS148487) and Danger (WS986413): For the majority of this reporting period, the 86th Engineer Battalion provided engineer support for FSB Schroeder and FSB Danger. However, the 86th Engineer Battalion was reassigned to higher priority projects and elements of Company A were assigned to support these bases. Most of the work consisted of maintenance projects on the interior roads and drainage. It was necessary to continuously haul rock from Dong Tam to maintain the interior roads. Also, it was necessary to construct an additional area for the artillery at FSB Danger.

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This was done by dozing up an elevated pad, 150 meters by 50 meters, which had easy access to Highway QL4. As of the end of this reporting period, preparations are being made to redeploy from these bases. Extra construction materials have been evacuated and several bunkers have been dismantled and evacuated.

(d) My Phuoc Tay (XS201598): Operations at My Phuoc Tay were completed early in this period. The 13 helicopter landing pads were anchored to prevent their being moved around by the transient helicopters. A second application of peneprime was used to eliminate the inherent dust problems and aid in erosion prevention. A total of eight airmobile bunkers were constructed in Dong Tam and flown to My Phuoc Tay to provide protection to the personnel operating the rearm/refuel point, and to store large supplies of ammunition.

(e) Long Dinh Bridge (XS330495): Work continued this period on the radar bunker and tower complex at the Long Dinh Bridge for the 1/11th Artillery Battalion. Although the project was hampered by the lack of materials, it was completed on schedule. A great deal of effort was expended in repairing the decking on the Long Dinh Bridge. Approximately 20% of the treadway and decking were removed and replaced because they had become damaged by the heavy traffic crossing the bridge.

(f) My Da (WS997621): During the period 24 May 1969, through 21 June 1969, Company A initiated construction of a fire support base for the 1/11th Artillery Battalion at My Da in northwestern Dinh Tuong Province. The project originally called for the construction of three 10'x30' sleeping bunkers and six elevated firing platforms for M102, 105mm howitzers. Lack of material delayed progress for several weeks, and finally the project was terminated after four of the 10'x30' bunkers had been complete. Due to the division's redeployment, plans for the firing platforms were abandoned.

(g) Can Giuoc (X3834735): Late in this reporting period, Company A was given responsibility for the improvement of the fire support base at Can Giuoc for the 3d Brigade. The facility will eventually be the base camp for an infantry battalion and an artillery battery. A total of 64 new bunkers have been scheduled for construction. These include 27 fighting bunkers, 26 sleeping bunkers, 7 ammo storage bunkers, 2 aid stations, a tactical operations center, and a fire direction center. Company A is scheduled to receive support for this project from Company D, 15th Engineer Battalion and Company B, 60th Engineer Battalion. All construction is planned to be completed before 11 August 1969.

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(4) Road Construction and Repair:

(a) TL22 (XS483516 to XS516563): Repair of this six kilometer section of TL22 has required constant effort since 30 May 1969 and is continuing at this time. More than 400 loads of fill from local borrow pits and 60 loads of gravel from Dong Tam have been hauled to repair the vast number of craters and trenches that the enemy has made to interdict the road. Along with the actual road work, a total of four bridges have been replaced or repaired. At this time, work has further been hampered by the vast amount of vegetation that has overgrown sections of the road. However this problem is being alleviated by using the flame tracks in conjunction with standard earthmoving equipment to clear away the vegetation. Enemy activity has not been a serious problem to the project, however on several occasions newly emplaced grenades and booby traps have been found by the daily minesweep of the project site. Heavy rains have also hampered progress, but work is still going on with enthusiasm.

(b) Access Road to FSB Moore (XS266507): Additional construction work and continuous maintenance on the FSB Moore access road have continued during this period. Along with constant grading, the road has been completely surfaced with crushed rock in an attempt to maintain it. However, with the heavy rains and the heavy truck traffic, the road has remained in constant need of repair. If the road were to be used after the division's redeployment, it is highly recommended that it be stabilized with lime.

(c) Cai Nua Road (XS118460): Work on the Cai Nua Road was terminated early in this reporting period due to the heavy losses of men and equipment during the last reporting period. However, access to the area was facilitated by the removal and reconstruction of the major bridge on the road. The abutments were completely rebuilt and the bridge replaced. The original stringers were reused as part of the construction material. The bridge is now capable of carrying all military and civilian traffic up to a Class 21. It has been modified over the previous bridge so that it is capable of accommodating three-wheeled vehicles, such as the typical Vietnamese Lambretta.

(5) Land Clearing Operations: In conjunction with 7th ARVN Division troops, land clearing operations continued this period in two locations near the city of My Tho. At the first project site east of My Tho (XS550465), the same basic approach, as reported in last quarter's ORLL, of cutting traces through the wood lines at intervals rather than removing all the vegetation was continued. D7E bulldozers were employed to clear all ground

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capable of supporting them. Very effective use was made of airlifting and placing a 45' dry span bridge across streams and canals, thus enabling dozers to cross these obstructions. Demolitions were used very effectively to clear all areas that would not support the dozers. A total of 125 acres were cleared in this manner. On 12 June 1969, operations were moved to the area west of My Tho (XS474452). However, by this time the heavy rains had saturated the ground to such a point that further use of dozers was impossible. An attempt was made to continue land clearing by using demolitions teams in conjunction with the flame tracks, but on 23 June 1969, the project was terminated after 4 acres had been cleared, due to the ever worsening terrain conditions. Throughout the entire operation, progress was seriously hampered by the inability of the 7th ARVN Division to provide proper security and sufficient personnel to do the necessary hand labor.

(6) Combat Support Operations: During the reporting period, Company A continued to provide teams of specialists to the units of the 1st Brigade to do demolition work, clear mines and booby traps, and to locate caches with their mine detectors. Normally, a three or four man team was attached to each platoon size element for such operations. This team's equipment would consist of 25 pounds of demolitions per man, grappling hooks, and a mine detector if the mission called for one. The engineers were used not only to clear mines and booby traps, they were also used extensively to locate them because of their experience with the enemy's methods of employing mines and booby traps. The number of these missions has decreased substantially since the last reporting period, as the engineers have been used more and more for maintenance work on fire support bases.

(7) Minesweep Operations:

(a) The daily minesweep of QL4 between FSB Moore and the Long Dinh Bridge continued as the only daily minesweep conducted by Company A throughout this period. For the most part, negative results were obtained by this daily minesweep. However, on two occasions, the road in the vicinity of the Rice Mill (XS310501) was mined and cratered as it has been in the past. On both occasions, the road was cleared of mines and the road repaired to allow traffic to pass. Both incidents, were the result of improper security of this vulnerable portion of the road by both U.S. and ARVN forces.

(b) The only other minesweeps conducted by Company A this period, were the frequent minesweeps conducted at project

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sites that were not continuously secured. Although, numerous mines and booby traps were found by these minesweeps, no serious injuries to personnel or damage to construction of equipment was reported.

d. Company B:

(1) The mission of Company B is to provide general engineer support throughout the division's TAOI. In this respect, Company B has been primarily responsible for all development work at Dong Tam. It has also supported the base development program at Tan An and conducted land clearing and combat support missions in the Dong Tam area.

(2) Dong Tam Base Development:

(a) A great deal of Company B's effort was directed at construction in the Division Headquarters Area during this period. Work on bunker repair and bunker roofs was completed prior to the onset of the monsoon season so that the rain could not do further damage to these structures. All duckboards and paths throughout the Division Headquarters Area were replaced with concrete sidewalks. In conjunction with the sidewalk construction, the entire drainage system in the area was repaired and expanded to provide adequate drainage for the rainy season. Four concrete guard bunkers were constructed to provide protection for the MP's guarding the DTCC. These bunkers were the first all concrete structures to be built at Dong Tam.

(b) Construction of bunker roofs continued throughout Dong Tam during this reporting period. A total of 14 of these roofs were constructed by Company B and many more were constructed with the engineers providing only technical assistance. These roofs will prevent bunkers from collapsing from the additional weight of water-saturated earth fill.

(c) Company B has become quite adept at the construction of various types of towers, since they have been required to build many of these structures. Two wooden, airmobile, observation towers were built at Dong Tam and were then flown into location in sections. Most impressive, though, was the construction of two 60' steel guard towers on the north berm at Dong Tam. This project was hampered by the lack of a crane tall enough to lift the heavy steel parts into place. However, the men of Company B showed great ingenuity and skill by hoisting the parts into place by hand, and completed the project without any lost time or a single injury.

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(d) Company B also has responsibility for the repair of the berm, berm roads, and berm bunkers at Dong Tam. Three new berm bunkers were constructed, and the A and C Sector berm roads were completely rebuilt. Of course with the start of the rainy season, all of the berm roads required constant maintenance and the berm had to be repaired every time a washout occurred. It is suggested that if the division were to remain in Dong Tam, that the berm roads be stabilized with lime and the berm be continuously seeded with grass to prevent erosion.

(e) Company B is quite regularly called upon to do emergency repairs on all type of structures on Dong Tam. During this period, bunkers were continuously in need of repair. Company B accomplished major repairs on four personnel bunkers and provided technical assistance and supervision for the repair of many more. Also Company B repairs a great deal of the mortar damage on Dong Tam either by direct construction effort or by providing technical assistance to other unit to do their own repairs.

(3) Tan An Base Construction: During the reporting period, Company B has given continuous engineer support to the 3d Brigade for the base development program at Tan An. At this time, Company B has constructed a messhall with water tower, a two-story troop billets, and an equipment maintenance complex. They are scheduled to continue construction at Tan An until the company stands down for redeployment on 11 August 1969.

(4) Combat Support Operations:

(a) Company B continued its land clearing operations this period by cutting back the tree line north of the Dong Tam berm. A total of 6 acres were cleared utilizing heavy equipment, demolitions, and civilian laborers. The enemy not only used mines and booby traps to deter progress on this project, but they used extensive psychological warfare in an attempt to frighten the Vietnamese laborers.

(b) The daily minesweep of the Dong Tam access road was also the responsibility of Company B. Although, this road has recently been paved with asphalt and the enemy has made no recent attempt to interdict it, the minesweep will be continued to make sure that this essential road remains open to traffic.

(c) On several occasion, Company B undertook demolition missions in support of the 6/31st Infantry Battalion. The main purpose of these missions was to destroy enemy bunkers

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and positions from which the enemy was suspected of mortaring Donq Tam. At the same time, enemy booby traps were destroyed and suspected cache sites were inspected.

e. Company C:

(1) During the reporting period, Company C's mission has remained to provide direct combat engineer support to the 3d Brigade in Long An Province. The company has also had secondary missions of base development at Tan An Airfield and Tan An Main. The greatest portion of the support work for the 3d Brigade has been that of fire support base upgrade and construction. Emphasis also was placed on upgrading of roads, minesweeps, and combat support of infantry and Navy operations.

(2) Fire Support Base Construction:

(a) Can Giuoc (XS827719): The 3d Brigade acquired operational control of an infantry battalion from the 199th Infantry Brigade during the reporting period. The concept of operations included basing the new battalion at Can Giuoc. Preliminary development of the base camp included the construction of a paddy fill road to a group of metal buildings within the base, construction of paddy fill parking and turn around areas, and capping the road with 1½" minus rock. When the infantry battalion moved in, Company C sent two platoons to Can Giuoc to build eight 10'x15' single walled bunkers; five three-man latrines; five showers; a paddy fill, CH-47 pad; paddy fill 4.2 inch mortar pads and a paddy fill ammunition storage point for the supporting 105mm howitzer battery. A misunderstanding in the desired location of the battalion headquarters at Can Giuoc caused the required area for the battalion to be increased by 80%. This required the upgrading of two more roads after the rainy season had started. Thus far, paddy fill and laterite have been used without much success on these projects. Late in the reporting period, responsibility for construction at Can Giuoc was turned over to Company A, 15th Engineer Battalion as part of the accelerated fire support base development program.

(b) Rach Kien (XS742699): Base development at Rach Kien has continued in the form of single walled, bunker construction. The rate of construction has slowed in this reporting period because a theater wide lumber shortage has seriously decreased the amount of construction materials available. Each bunker had to be considered as a different project because the lumber available was of varying sizes and quantities. Thus no standard design could be used on all the

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bunkers in the base camp. At the close of the reporting period, bunker construction was still in progress at Rach Kien. Also, four massive concrete pads for the 4.2 inch mortars were also constructed on a self-help basis at Rach Kien. At present these pads are giving adequate ground support to the battalion's mortar section. They are a vast improvement over previous facilities.

(c) Tan Tru (XS655623): Base development at Tan Tru followed basically the same pattern as at Rach Kien. The major effort was on self help single walled bunker construction, with work progress being hampered by the theater wide lumber shortage. At the close of the reporting period, 95% of the proposed bunker construction at Tan Tru had been completed.

(d) Binh Phuoc (XS608553): The base development at Binh Phuoc was handled primarily by Company D, 86th Engineer Battalion. Company C, 15th Engineer Battalion began a program of pouring concrete pads at the base camp road intersections to prevent the M113 tracks from destroying the interior roads during the wet season.

(e) Tan An Main (XS545648): Tan An Main development encompassed construction of living bunkers (double walled), resurfacing the parking lot, improvement of area drainage, and upgrading the new mess hall road. A total of six, double walled bunkers have been built with an undetermined amount yet to be constructed. In the last month of the reporting period, the rain hampered the retrieval of paddy fill and subsequent placement of the paddy fill in the double walled bunkers. The parking lot was resurfaced by removing the old M8A1 steel matting, filling the low spots with paddy fill, compacting with a sheepsfoot roller, regrading the surface, capping it with rock, and penetrating the area. Area drainage was started by installing culverts and ditches according to the 93d Engineer Battalion survey and drainage plan of the 3d Brigade base camp. Difficulty is arising from the condition and width of the roads. The slippery, narrow roads cause many vehicles to slide into the ditches and disrupt the flow of water. This condition can be cured only by increasing the road width to at least thirty feet.

(f) Tan An Airfield (XS524656): Tan An Airfield has undergone the most radical change during the reporting period. The area was transformed from a group of Southeast Asia huts to two-story frame buildings. The construction was accomplished on a self help basis by the tenant units. The total program produced eight, two-story billets; two, one-story billets; one mess hall;

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one orderly room; one supply room; a maintenance facility for a direct support maintenance company; and, a technical supply building for the same unit. All buildings were built on concrete pads. Area drainage has also been emphasized during the period. Improvements have been made through the installation of culverts, bulkheads, and ditches. The problem of narrow, slippery roads and heavy vehicular traffic seems to be diluting the effectiveness of the program as it is at the 3d Brigade Headquarters.

(3) Combat Support Operations:

(a) A total of four demolition missions were performed in support of the 3d Brigade operations and Navy PER operations. Forty-five bunkers and three booby traps were destroyed.

(b) Road sweeps were conducted on call throughout the reporting period. The 2/4th Artillery Battalion requested one sweep from XS593564 to XS487572. The sweep was performed and uncovered one pressure mine that was destroyed in place. The sweep was requested in conjunction with the movement of their 155mm SP howitzers.

(c) Two regular roadsweeps were discontinued during the reporting period. The minesweep from QL4 to Tan Tru was discontinued because our requirement to go to Tan Tru every day was cancelled by the lumber shortage there. The infantry continued to sweep the road. While the company was working on the road from Rach Kien to Ben Luc, the road was swept every day. The sweep rarely uncovered a mine, but trucks continued to be damaged by mines on that road. When the weather precluded any further work on the road, the sweep was discontinued.

(4) Road Repair:

(a) Phase I work was completed on the road from the intersection of TL18 and TL15 to QL4 at Ben Luc. The road base was raised above the level of the paddies by using local paddy fill. Phase III work was not completed, therefore the road is not suitable for military traffic during the wet season. The rock and laterite cap provided in Phase III work will be necessary to enable the road to hold its shape under heavy traffic.

(b) The road from QL4 to Tan Tru and the road from Tan An to Binh Phuoc were repaired after they were damaged by heavy rains. Repairs were accomplished by ripping the roads'

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surfaces with D7E dozers and reshaping the surfaces with a grader. The moist condition of the laterite and heavy vehicle traffic during the repair operation gave the necessary compaction. Company D, 80th Engineer Battalion helped on the Binh Phuoc road.

f. Company D:

(1) During this reporting period, Company D has continued its primary mission of providing direct combat engineer support to the division's 2d Brigade in Kien Hoa Province. This support has consisted of a wide variety of engineer activities with primary emphasis being placed on fire support base construction and land clearing operations. In addition, Company D has supported the accelerated base development program in Long An Province by accomplishing several projects at the Tan An Airfield and by salvaging materials from the fire support bases in Kien Hoa Province. The Flame Platoon, which is attached to Company D, has provided general support to the division with its burning and security capabilities.

(2) Fire Support Base Construction:

(a) Fire Support Base Klaw II (XS598288): Activities at FSB Klaw II was mainly concerned with the construction of a facility for the radar and weather station at that location. An elevated pad was constructed to provide a suitable location for the complex. Five airmobile bunkers were flown to the site to provide protection for the personnel operating the complex and another bunker was built on the site to house the equipment. A tower with a protective roof was also constructed to protect the radar antenna from the rain, while also giving it the necessary elevation.

(b) Ham Long Mortar Site (XS455355): A small fire support base was constructed for a platoon of 4.2 inch mortars from the 4/47th Infantry Battalion in the village of Ham Long. A total of six bunkers were constructed by Company D and technical assistance was provided to the infantry for the construction of firing positions and field fortifications.

(c) Ben Tre Soccer Field (XS513317): Work at the 2d Brigade CP at the Ben Tre Soccer Field was confined to maintenance and protection for the bunkers against the heavy rains. Simple, shed-type, tin roofs were built for all bunkers to help protect them from the rain. Drainage for the entire base was a continuous problem that required constant attention. The internal roads were also a constant problem, but periodic grading kept them in a passable condition during the entire period.

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(3) Land Clearing Operations:

(a) Company D was able to complete its land clearing operations along Route 175 during this reporting period. Approximately 100 acres of jungle were cut down with the use of heavy equipment, demolitions, and Vietnamese laborers. Of particular interest was the fact that during this period there was very little enemy harassment of the project. And further, no mines, booby traps, or bunkers were found in the area cleared.

(b) Land clearing operations were conducted to clear the jungle from both sides of LTL6A, north of the Bai Lai Bridge. A great deal of success was obtained initially with the exclusive use of D7E bulldozers. However, as the monsoon season continued, the use of the dozers had to be discontinued due to the steady deterioration of the terrain conditions. Demolitions and Vietnamese laborers were used to continue the project until it was terminated. A total of 120 acres were cleared before the project was ended.

(4) Tan An Base Development: Late in the period, elements of Company D were sent to Tan An to assist in construction at that location. In conjunction with Company C, 15th Engineer Battalion, the ammo storage points at the Tan An Airfield were constructed in record time. Company D also assumed responsibility for the drainage at the Tan An Airfield and has already installed many culverts and headwalls, and repaired most of the main drainage ditches. Several troop billets have also been scheduled to be constructed by Company D, in support of the base development program.

(5) Bridge Repair:

(a) After the bridge on the Ben Tre bypass road (XS497328) was destroyed by enemy sappers, Company D immediately began repair work. It was found that only the west abutment had been damaged and that the rest of the bridge could still be used. A new concrete abutment was constructed and the rest of the bridge was jacked back into place. New concrete wing walls were also constructed to prevent erosion from taking place behind the abutment.

(b) The bridge at XS436357 on TL26 was hastily replaced in support of combat operations. Expedient type abutments and wing walls were constructed using timbers and a 45', M4T6, dry span which was flown to the location by a CH-54 helicopter. This method of flying a bridge that had been

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constructed in one location to a bridge site in another location, has proved to be the most efficient means of making a hasty crossing of short, stream gaps.

(c) The repairs of the 350' Eiffel bridge at Binh Chanh (XS633253) consisted of replacing all of the timber members of the bridge. The materials for the project were cut to the proper size at the Ben Tre Soccer Field and were airlifted to the project site. The bridge was repaired in sections, so that traffic could be allowed to pass.

(6) Combat Support Operations:

(a) Very few combat support missions were conducted by Company D this reporting period. This was due to the 2^d Brigade's early redeployment and to the heavy commitment of the engineers to construction and land clearing. However, the daily minesweeps of the Ben Tre bypass road, Route 175, and the My Tho Ferry landing were continued throughout this period with very few incidents being reported.

(b) The Flame Platoon continued its general support mission by conducting burning operations throughout the division's TAOI. The platoon was used at all of the battalions land clearing and road construction projects to burn away heavy vegetation and to provide security for the construction crew. They were also used to support infantry operations in heavily wooded areas. The flame tracks again proved to be particularly effective in burning paths through heavily booby trapped areas and burning the cover off hidden enemy bunkers.

(7) Redeployment Activities: Due to the early redeployment of the 2^d Brigade, Company D has already started to dismantle bunkers at the various fire support bases in Kien Hoa Province and retrograde the materials to support the construction effort in Long An Province. By the end of the reporting period, thirteen, automobile bunkers had already been flown to the fire support base at Can Giuoc. Also, approximately 10,000 board feet of timber has been recovered from bunkers at the Ben Tre Soccer Field and transported to Can Giuoc. This recovery operation will continue until all usable materials have been recovered.

g. Company E:

(1) The mission of Company E continues to be that of providing general support to the division in the form of a tactical bridging capability. Although organized as a float bridge company, Company E has been involved in many varied types

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of bridging activities. In addition to the installation, operation, and removal of M416 float bridging and ferries, the company's work has included the repair, upgrade, and construction of Eiffel, Bailey, and timber trestle bridges. Also, the new lightweight AVLB has given Company E the ability of providing direct support to the troops in the field.

(2) In its role of providing direct bridging support to the division, Company E has moved independently within the division's T/OI to meet bridge requirements on a scheduled or contingency basis. The need for flexibility and speed of response was demonstrated clearly by operations during the reporting period. Several recurring points of interest have arisen from these operations. First, the use of helicopter lift capabilities greatly increases the company's mission range and speed of response. Second, the existence of a continuous and detailed reconnaissance effort is necessary for the effective completion of any bridge mission. Third, the use of "book" solutions is rarely applicable in the Mekong River Delta.

(3) The following operations were conducted during the reporting period by Company E:

(a) An 87 meter long Eiffel bridge at Ap Bac (XS153726) was repaired during the early part of the period in support of allied naval operations in the area. The bridge was cut into five sections and then raised to proper height by alternately jacking and cribbing under each section. After being raised the bridge was connected back together using angle iron welded into the main bridge members. New decking and treadway were added to the bridge, and the gaps between Eiffel sections were filled by short, timber spans built into the top of each crib.

(b) During the period 11-14 May 1969, a Bailey bridge at XS105456 was extracted from its gap after it had collapsed under an excessive load several days before. In removing the bridge, it was necessary to use three D-7 dozers, a 20-ton crane, a cutting torch, and approximately 100 pounds of demolitions. Only a small portion of the bridge was considered re-usable after being extracted.

(c) A four float raft and two bridge boats were airlifted by a CH-47 helicopter and emplaced at XS722539 on 12 May 1969, in support of the 86th Engineer Battalion's effort on TL21. After several days operation, the raft was converted to a six float M416 bridge with two, 45' dry spans used as end

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ramps; the bridge boats were removed by airlift. Shortly thereafter, two more floats were emplaced making an eight float bridge. This bridge is still in use.

(d) During the period 26 May 1969, through 25 June 1969, various repairs were made on all bridges on QL4 west. These repairs included tightening of all clamps and bracing on all Bailey bridges and replacing decking and/or treadway on all badly worn bridges.

(e) A small Eiffel bridge on TL22 (XS485516) was repaired on 28 June 1969. This repair involved placing cribbing beneath the second panel and removing the end panel. This three meter section was replaced with a timber span.

(f) The AVLB Platoon was re-organized during this reporting period. The platoon has been equipped with the new, light-weight AVLB's mounted on M113A1 armor personnel carriers. Because of their light-weight construction, the bridges will carry only a class 12 load. Shortly after being equipped, the platoon was sent to Long An Province in support of the 2/47th Infantry Battalion operating in that area. Several problems have been encountered with the new equipment, however, their general rating has been termed satisfactory by the 2/47th Infantry Battalion. To date over 800 vehicles have been crossed over the bridges of the AVLB Platoon.

6. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. Maintenance: During the reporting period, the battalion was able to maintain its high serviceability profile of category I. This continued high standard of maintenance is due to the aggressive preventative maintenance program and the rapid turn-in of all unserviceable and unreliable equipment. The lack of repair parts for low density items has greatly hindered the immediate repair of deadlined equipment. In several instances, serviceable equipment has had to be retrograded for lack of a single repair part. Rebuilt parts are also continuing to be problems. Parts are being improperly assembled and, in some cases, the wrong rebuild kits are being used. As a result, the amount of time that equipment has been deadlined has increased and in one incident, an accident resulted.

b. Supply: During the reporting period, the battalion went from a C-4 rating to a C-2 rating. This improvement was due to the large influx of new equipment which replaced shortages, combat losses, and unserviceable equipment. Only eleven items

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remained at zero balance, and they are of the one authorized, low density item category. Because of the divisions redeployment, all requisitions were cancelled as of 1 July 1969. Further, with the division's redeployment, the battalion is concentrating on turning in its critical engineer equipment; bringing the company to be left in Vietnam to full strength on equipment, and preparing the remainder of the battalion's equipment for shipment to Hawaii.

c. Class II & IV Supplies: Providing materials for battalion engineer projects has continued with very few projects being held up due to material shortages. However, some material, such as 1", 3", and 4" lumber and 16d and 20d nails, have become very scarce and will cause projects to be held up if something is not done to alleviate the shortages. G-4 has assured us that every effort is being made to secure materials from every available source. Consequently, we have been able to draw sufficient supplies of these critical materials to keep all projects going. The largest projects under way at this time are the base development efforts at both Tan An and Can Giuoc. These projects should eliminate all materials now in our II & IV yard by the time the battalion is ready to redeploy. Any remaining materials will be turned over to our company that will remain in Tan An to support the 3d Brigade.

d. Water Supply: During the reporting period, the battalion operated eight separate water supply points. Erdatators of 1500 GPH production capacity were located at Tan An and Tan Tru, while 600 GPH units were in operation at FSB Danger, FSB Schroeder, Tigers Lair, Long Dinh Bridge and Dinh Phuoc. Also, a 1500 GPH Erdatator from the 86th Engineer Battalion was operated by the battalion at Ben Tre. With the redeployment of the division, all water points have been removed from Kien Hoa Province and will be removed from Dinh Tuong Province before the battalion redeploys. A total of five water points will remain in support of the 3d Brigade. These will be located at Tan An, Binh Phuoc, Tan Tru, Rach Kien, and Can Giuoc. Company C, 15th Engineer Battalion, the company which will remain in support of the 3d Brigade, will control and operate only the water point at Tan An. The supply of water, at any of the water points was not interrupted for maintenance for longer than two days during the reporting period. This was possible, due to our ability to keep at least one spare pump available, at all times, to replace any pump in need of maintenance. Repair parts remained as the most critical maintenance problem for the pumps. Local procurement and fabrication of repair parts helped to keep pumps in operation. Several new electrical pumps have been received through supply channels, however many new pumps, both electrical and gasoline driven, will be needed to keep up with

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the ever increasing requirements for potable water. If this unit had been required to operate eight water points for an indefinite period of time, as was intended before the order to redeploy was given, we could not have continued much longer without a large number of repair parts and new replacement pumps. This problem was reaching such an acute stage that it would have seriously curtailed our ability to supply the division with potable water.

e. Medical: The monthly outpatient rate at the battalion aid station has remained at an average of 150 patients per month for this reporting period. The incidence of skin disease, which had been steadily declining, has begun to slowly increase again due to the start of the monsoon season. Anti-fungal pills have been issued to those units and personnel who are subject to constant wet-working conditions. Both battle and non-battle injuries have declined during this reporting period. Injuries due to hostile fire decreased 66% over the last reporting period. Accidental injuries resulting from strictly engineer activities have also declined due to the battalions continually stressed safety program. There is, however, still an unacceptably high number of these injuries.

7. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. MEDCAP/ICAF Program: On a bi-weekly basis, the S-5 section conducted MEDCAP's and/or ICAF's in conjunction with the battalions road construction projects and land clearing operations. The purpose of this program is to insure the local civilians of our good intentions and friendship, and to gain valuable information about enemy activities that might endanger our men and equipment. Through our efforts, we were able to establish a high degree of rapport with the civilians, although we gained very little information. Our lack of success might have something to do with the fact that most of the questions pertained to enemy sapper activities. Although there were many sapper activities at our project sites, it is believed that the local citizens honestly had no prior knowledge of these activities. This has led us to believe that enemy sapper units operate independently of any local guerrilla units, making them even more difficult to find and destroy.

b. Construction Activities:

(1) After the large battle with enemy forces at Thu Thua (XS537720) in early May, a great deal of assistance was given to the people in the area. Heavy equipment was used to repair the village's roads and bridges that were damaged by artillery during the battle. Trucks and scoop loaders were used to clean the

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large quantities of debris and haul it away to facilitate the self-help reconstruction program. Technical assistance was also provided for the repair of many civic building projects.

(2) Marshall Nguyen Huynh Duc's Tomb was renovated during the reporting period, prior the presentation of the Lo Bo by the division to the curator of the tomb site. This project included paintings, landscaping, providing materials for the refurbishing of the tomb, construction of a parking lot, and the upgrade of the road connecting the tomb site with Highway QL4.

SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

1. (C) ELEM CONSTRUCTION:

OBSERVATION: The heavy monsoon rains quickly erode steep walled berms thus exposing personnel and equipment to direct enemy fire.

EVALUATION: Obviously, a gradual slope on berms would decrease the tendency to erode, but this may not be practicable due to the large amount of space necessary to build such a berm. If one slope of the berm is reveted, this area may be cut in half. Various means of stabilizing berms could be used also to prevent erosion and decrease the amount of maintenance required to maintain the berm.

RECOMMENDATION: The interior slope of all berms should consist of some type of revetment if space is limited. This slope of the berm should not exceed 20%. Also, grass should be planted on the outer slope to further prevent erosion.

2. (U) GRASS CULTIVATION:

OBSERVATION: Heavy rains continuously wash away grass seed planted on a steeply inclined surface, thus hindering attempts to stabilize the surface.

EVALUATION: Some means of retaining the grass seed on a slope should be used. Typical means, such as the use of straw or burlap, are not effective because they do not last long enough in the climate of the Mekong River Delta. The application of a thin layer of penepime over the freshly planted grass seed is effective, but wears away with repeated heavy rains. It has been found that repeated applications of penepime do not prohibit the growth of grass if the applications are applied thinly and over a period of time determined by the amount and intensity of local rains.

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RECOMMENDATION: Grass seed can be retained on an inclined surface, if peneprime is continually applied to the area on a scheduled basis determined by local weather conditions.

3. (C) BOOBY TRAP CLEARING:

OBSERVATION: Soldiers have been observed using the M-79 grenade launcher to dispose of booby traps.

EVALUATION: The practice of using the M-79 as a means to clear booby traps has proved to be highly dangerous. On two occasions during the reporting period, members of infantry units were observed using this method. On both occasions, injuries were sustained by personnel in the area. The unexpected size of secondary explosions and poor judgement as to what protective cover should have been taken were the main factors for the injuries in both cases. The proper use of demolitions or a grappling hook are far safer methods of clearing booby traps, even if they take longer.

RECOMMENDATION: All personnel should be forbidden to use the M-79 grenade launcher as a means to clear booby traps and should be instructed in the approved methods of booby trap clearing.

4. (U) ROAD CONSTRUCTION:

OBSERVATION: Roads using paddy fill for base material hold up quite well during the wet season if care is taken in their construction.

EVALUATION: A road base made of paddy fill can be made by dozing fill from both sides of the road. The base is made in six inch layers with extreme care being taken to insure that each layer is properly compacted. Ideally, each level should be stabilized with lime, however lime is not always available or economical. When the required road elevation is reached, the surface is graded and then capped with two, 3" lifts of 1½" minus rock. Each layer of rock should be properly rolled.

RECOMMENDATION: With proper care taken in construction, the above method will produce a tactical road capable of passing traffic in all types of weather. This method should be considered when planning programs of tactical road construction since it is not as time consuming and does not require special equipment.

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1 May 1969 to 30 June 1969.

5. (C) ROAD MAINTENANCE:

OBSERVATION: The established secondary roads within the division TAOI have enough rock and laterite in their surfaces to require only periodic grading during the wet season.

EVALUATION: Heavy rains and heavy military traffic will cause secondary roads to deteriorate if the crown of the roads is not maintained. If ruts are allowed to form, the road will soon become impassable. By simple periodic grading, the crown of the road may be maintained; and, if ruts are graded out as they appear, the road may be kept passable.

RECOMMENDATION: An effective program of periodic road main maintenance should be established within the division TAOI. By this means, a great many road problems may be taken care of before they become serious.

William H. Keech

WILLIAM H. KEECH
MAJ, CE
Acting Commander

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
15TH ENGINEER BATTALION
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

1. Organic Units
 - a. Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - b. Company A
 - c. Company B
 - d. Company C
 - e. Company D
 - f. Company E
2. Attached Units
 - a. Flame and Security Platoon
 - b. Provisional Airboat Platoon

Incl 1

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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL
15TH ENGINEER BATTALION
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

POSITION	NAME	RANK
CO	Jester, Guy E.	LTC
XO	Vacant	N/A
ADE	Keech, William H.	MAJ
S-1	Brown, Joseph K.	1LT
S-2	Herschlip, William R.	1LT
S-3	Ostenberg, Thomas F.	MAJ
Asst S-3	Perry, Frederick C., Jr	CPT
S-4	Newsham, Thomas D.	CPT
SGM	Sutton, Hubert F.	MSG
CO, HHC	Floyd, Benzell	1LT
CO, Co A	Pierman, Dennis F.	CPT
CO, Co B	Carroll, Philip W., III	CPT
CO, Co C	Brunnhoeffler, Gilbert C.	CPT
CO, Co D	Kobea, Frank J.	CPT
CO, Co E	Leverett, Hubbert L.	CPT

Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 9TH SIGNAL BATTALION
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96370

AVDE-SLO

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period Ending 30 June 1969
(RCS/CSPOR-65) (UIC-WDXAA) (U)

Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-IH
APO San Francisco 96370

SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL/UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) INTRODUCTION: The 9th Signal Battalion continued its support of the 9th Infantry Division in all of its operations. Multichannel VHF systems provided the primary means of communications with FM radio, AM SSB voice, and radio teletype providing secondary or alternate means of communications.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:
 - a. May: On 4 May 1969 the Division Alternate Communications System at Vung Tau was discontinued and replaced by an alternate VHF terminal on the Dong Tam Base Camp. Two towers were constructed; a 100 foot tower at Rach Kien on 4 May and a 125 foot tower at FSPB Danger on 25 May. The USS Benawah returned to the MRF after refitting in Japan. After establishing a test VHF system, the system from the USS Colleton was discontinued and the system to the USS Benawah was established. Circuits were established on 11 May.

 - b. June: On 1 June plans were made to establish a multichannel VHF system from Dong Tam to Luc Hoa in support of the 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry. A VHF relay was required at Tuyen Nhon and a FM radio retransmission set co-located with the relay. The equipment was airlifted by CH-47 on the morning of 4 June 1969. The system was established that evening. The operation was completed on 11 June. All equipment returned to Dong Tam the following day.


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DECLASSIFIED AT 3YRS INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVDE-SLO 21 July 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period Ending 30 June 1969 (U)

SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED, COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Negative Report.



CHARLES J LOWMAN JR
LTC, SC
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-AN

10 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 June
1969. (RCS/CS FCR-65) (R-1)

Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-MH
APO San Francisco 96370

Section 1, Significant Organization/Unit Activities

1. (C) Introduction:
 - a. The mission of the 9th Aviation Battalion is to provide aviation support for the division headquarters, division support command, units without organic aircraft, and limited general support to units with aircraft.
 - b. The 9th Aviation Battalion supported the division for 61 days in the quarter. Daily missions of resupply, command control, utility, liaison, aerial escort, gunship support, counter mortar watch and courier were accomplished on a recurring basis.
2. (U) Organization:
 - a. The composition of the 9th Aviation Battalion, (Combat), 9th Infantry Division is:
 1. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, (Combat)
 2. Company A (Assault Helicopter)
 3. Company E (General Support)
 - b. Company B, 709th Maintenance Battalion continues in attached status as part of the decentralized maintenance concept organization.
 - c. Troop D, 3rd Squadron 5th Cavalry Regiment was attached by general order number 2499 dated 3 March 1969. This attachment is for administration and logistics only. The troop remains under division G-3 for operations and training.
 - d. The 361st Aviation Detachment is attached under general order number 10374 dated 2 November 1968. This attachment is for administration and logistics and includes operational control.
 - e. Organizational structure and roster of key personnel are attached as inclosures.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DCD DIR 5200.10

- (1) Inclusion 1: Organizational Structure
- (2) Inclusion 2: Roster of Key personnel
- (3) Inclusion 3: Psychological Operations and Civic Action

f. All headquarters of the Battalion are located at Dong Tam base coordinates XS 4142.

3.7 (U) Personnel and Administration:

- a. The aviation battalion reported a C-2 rating for personnel during the reporting period. On the Job Training (OJT) and awards of MCS to qualified personnel are now being accomplished.
- b. Morale within the battalion remained high as reflected by the increased number of foreign service tour extensions. The battalion also had five reenlistments for the reporting period.

4. (U) Intelligence

- a. A visual road reconnaissance with timely reporting of obstacles to division and the 15th Engineers was conducted daily during the reporting period.
- b. The nightly "Eye in the Sky" was on standby during this reporting period. It is employed as required to observe areas of suspected enemy activities.
- c. A photo reconnaissance capability mounted in the U-6A aircraft in conjunction with 9th MI detachment provides immediate response to G-2 request for photo coverage.
- d. The intelligence section continues to provide the battalion staff and companies with information on enemy situation gleaned from the G-2 intelligence bulletins and from liaison with G-2 personnel. A weather briefing is given each day.
- e. A flak map is maintained to locate positions from which aircraft have received fire. An agent report map is maintained to detect patterns of Viet Cong movement.
- f. The intelligence section maintains map supplies and distributes maps to all aviators in the division and nondivisional units, the 162nd and 191st Assault Helicopter Companies.

5. (C) Operations

- a. Company A with 28 UH-1H's accomplished 21 daily missions of dedicated user support in spite of heavy combat damage incurred by the unit.

Company A flew 1085 hours of combat assault missions; 435 of these hours were night missions. Flexibility is the key of this unit's support. Under the direction of the Army Aviation Element (AAE), they must react immediately to changes in priorities or missions. Missions were accepted by the company to fly single and multiple ship Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) insertions and extractions both day and night. Combat assaults were flown independently and to reinforce assault helicopter companies and our supporting Cavalry troops. Company A carried 27,720 passenger and 255 tons of cargo for a total of 16,476 sorties in 6250 flying hours.

b. Company B provided the division with general aviation support with 6 AH-1G's, 4 UH-1C's, 3 LOH's and 2 U-6A's. Gunship missions included escort for: combat assaults, VIP flights, resupply in hostile areas, cargo and heavy lift helicopters, medical evacuations, people sniffer, road reconnaissance, road and water convoys, troop insertions and extractions. Other missions of the gunships include support to troops in contact, defense against rocket and mortar attacks at Tan An and Dong Tam, armed reconnaissance and strikes on targets of opportunity. The LOH's of the company provide daily transportation for the division liaison officers, and other missions as directed. The U-6A aircraft provides an expedient means of visually checking the road net in the TAOR at first light. These aircraft provide transportation for personnel and cargo on long distance missions. The U-6A is also used as a platform for night observation devices to observe activities in area Kudzu, and provide the division an aerial photo capability.

c. Pathfinder support increased during the reporting period. A two-man team is utilized daily to coordinate Chinook operations at Dong Tam. They provide terminal guidance, rigging assistance, and coordination with the Assistant Division Aviation Officer (ADAO), and between supported units. There has been an increased utilization of Binh Duc airstrip by U-21. The pathfinders have provided terminal guidance for all scheduled flights. Downed aircraft security and recovery is a major role of the detachment. With the inauguration of flare missions, all pathfinders have been trained in the employment of the MK 24 Mod 4 illumination flare. The pathfinders have provided rigging assistance, terminal guidance training and LZ/PZ operation training to many division units.

6. (C) Training:

a. Four outstanding enlisted men attended the division NCO academy. School training quotas continue to be aviation oriented. Nineteen enlisted men attended courses in avionics, technical supply, turbine engine repair, airframe repair and armament repair at Vung Tau. Eleven aviators completed aircraft transition and the Navy Jungle Environmental Survival Training. Eight enlisted men attended the Audio Visual School at Long Binh.

b. Unit training conducted was pilot's orientation briefing in accordance with USARV Regulation 95-26. Safety, operations, maintenance, map reading, communications, materiel readiness and weather training were integrated into these briefings.

c. A motor vehicle inspection period is conducted for two hours each morning and a driver training course is continuously maintained.

d. Companies conduct training in:

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| (1) Command Information | 1 hour weekly |
| (2) Care and cleaning of the M-16 rifle | 1 hour weekly |
| (3) Character guidance | 3 hours weekly |
| (4) First aid and emergency medical care | 1 hour quarterly |

Field sanitation, counterinsurgency and counter-guerrilla training, materiel readiness, heat injury and intelligence subjects are integrated into daily activities.

7. (C) Logistics and Maintenance: None

8. (U) Psychological Operations and Civic Action

See Incl 3 (unclassified)

9. (U) Regional Force/Popular Force upgrading and ARVN training: Omitted

10. (U) Engineer Support: Omitted

11. (U) Signal Support: Omitted

12. (C) Army Aviation

a. The 9th Infantry Division, in supporting two Corps Tactical Areas, obtains its aviation assets from both II FFV and IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). During the past quarter the 9th Infantry has been supported by the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) with (2) Assault Helicopter Companies (AHC) per day in direct support of 1st and 2nd Brigades operating in Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Province, respectively. The 3rd Brigade has been supported by II FFV with an AHC on a mission basis operating in Lang An Province.

b. The division lift requirement has been supported by IV Corps with the 147th Assault Support Helicopter Co (ASHC). Daily requirements involve 3 CH-47's flying an average of 18 hours and 36 sorties per day. Heavy lift requirements for the 3rd Brigade have been supported by II FFV with a CH-47 flying an average of 4.5 hours and 9 sorties per day.

c. The division CH-54 requirements are supplied by II FFV. Division requirements for CH-54 arise two or three times a week for an average of three sorties per day and two hours blade time. A recapitulation of heavy lift support for the quarter shows that 10,789 tons of cargo and 21,605 passengers were lifted for a total of 2,091.7 flying hours in support of the division.

d. Cavalry troop support for the division consists of D 3/5 Cavalry which is organic to the division and B 3/17 Cavalry which is in a direct support role. Additional cavalry troops are supplied to the division by both II FFV and IV CTZ on a mission basis as required.

13. (U) Chemical Operations: Catted

Section 2: Lessons learned, Commanders Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

Observation: C-2 rating was due to shortage of MCS trained personnel.
Evaluation: A discrepancy in the records of this units personnel accounting was found upon comparison with USARV records. Problem areas were pinpointed and shortage MCS area are being requisitioned and trained.
Recommendations: That units initiate closer liaison with USARV and division personnel sections.

b. Operations:

Observation: Much duplication was encountered in the operation of two separate company flight operations facilities.
Evaluation: After studying the problem, it was recommended that the flight operations section be consolidated to increase control, efficiency and responsiveness. This system has shown much improvement with an added benefit of elimination of duplicated equipment and personnel.
Recommendations: None

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence: None

e. Organization: None

f. Logistics/Maintenance: None

Section 3 lessons learned, Tactical Cover and Deception: None

3 Incl
AS

William E. Crouch, Jr.
WILLIAM E. CROUCH, JR.
LTC, FA
Commanding

6 AH-1G
28 UH-1H
4 UH-1C
3 OH-6A
2 U-6A

AVM BN

0 87 W
EM 746

(Attached)
(G011119)

Headquarters and
Headquarters Co.

0 20 W
EM 93

A
Assault Helicopter
Company

0 26 W
EM 207

B/709th
Transportation
Aircraft Maint.
Company

0 3 W
EM 138

D Troop
3rd Squadron
5th Cavalry

0 25 W
EM 189

B
General Support
Company

0 13 W
EM 109

361st
Aviation Detachment
(Division)

0 1 W
EM 32

Aviation Bn Infantry Div.
(MTOE 1-75C)

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AVDE-AN

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 June 1969
(RCS/CS FOR-65) (R-1)

Battalion Commander	LTC William E. Crouch, Jr.
Executive Officer	MAJ Charles R. Palmer
ADAO	CPT Dennis W. Moyer
S-1	1LT John Depko
S-2	CPT Herbert O. Elsworth
S-3	MAJ Teddy G. Allen
S-4	CPT Robert Sherry
Sergeant Major	CSM John L. Brewer
Surgeon	CPT Thomas W. Madland
Maintenance Officer	MAJ Jerry J. Getz
Safety Officer	CPT Lucien Brundage
CO, Hq & Hq Company	CPT William C. Fichau
CO, Company "A"	MAJ John C. Phillips, Jr.
CO, Company "B"	MAJ John Frazee
CO, Company "B" 709th Maint Bn	MAJ Gleb Kashin

Incl 2

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-AN

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 June 1968
(RCS/CS FCR-65) (P-1)

Psychological Operations and Civic Action (U)

1. Army aircraft flew daily leaflet drops for the Brigade S-5's.
2. The battalion is currently supporting the Division G-5 English classes in the My Tho City boys' high school (Nguyen Dinh Chieu) and girls' high school (Le Ngoc Han). Four members of the battalion teach English twice weekly to Vietnamese teenagers.
3. The Dinh Tuong Province 4-T Clubs (agricultural clubs similar to 4-H Clubs) have been actively supported by the battalion. Currently the Battalion S-5 Section is delivering soccer balls, dart boards, and domino games to the 29 clubs in the province. Membership in these clubs totals over 550 teenagers.
4. An active gratuity payment program has been instituted. The goal is to pay any Vietnamese citizen who has been involved in an incident with the 9th Aviation Battalion within twenty-four hours.

Incl 3

AVDE-PM

19 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) For Period Ending 30 June 1969; (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WVFDAL)(U)

Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-MH
APO San Francisco 96370

SCOPE: This report covers military police support to the 9th Infantry Division as performed by the 9th Military Police Company under the operational control of the Provost Marshal, 9th Infantry Division. Special emphasis is given to military police support in preparation for Division redeployment.

SIGNIFICANT MILITARY POLICE ACTIVITIES

1. INTRODUCTION: The mission of the 9th Military Police Company is to provide effective, responsive military police support to the 9th Infantry Division. In the course of providing this support, Division military police have supported Division Operations SPEEDY EXPRESS, KUDZU, QUET CHIEN, TOAN/THANG (Phase III), and Operation RICE FARMER, in Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Long An, Kien Phoung and Kien Hoa Provinces, Republic of Vietnam.

a. During the major portion of the reporting period, the concept of military police support to the 9th Infantry Division continued to place priority on field military police support and relegate the base camp oriented police support to a lesser priority.

b. During the latter portion of the reporting period, the emphasis of military police operations was shifted in anticipation of problems expected to arise as a result of the redeployment order; i.e., an orderly termination of military police field support as respective maneuver battalions stand down, provision for cohesive and highly flexible custodial program concerning detainees and prisoners of war, increased responsibilities concerning convoy security, intensified efforts to maintain order among transient members of the command, return to stateside standards in military dress and courtesy, and an aggressive and imaginative customs inspection program.

c. The organization of the military police company remained as last reported. However, the imminent redeployment required further internal tailoring of the company to accommodate the myriad of changing commitments. Most important of these changes was the deletion of the fifth platoon and a return to a more normal unit configuration.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) For Period Ending 30 June 1969; (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WVFDAA)(U)

19 July 1969

d. The 9th Military Police Company, under the operational control of the Provost Marshal, provided military police support for the following special events at Dong Tam:

- (1) 26 May 1969, Farewell Retreat Ceremony for MG ELKHARDT.
- (2) 31 May 1969, Farewell Awards & Decorations Ceremony for COL HUNT, Chief of Staff.
- (3) 6 June 1969, Retreat Ceremony for MG WETHERILL.
- (4) 15 June 1969, Organization Day, 15th Engineer Battalion.
- (5) 15 June 1969, Change of Command, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment.

e. On 2 May 1969, CPT Phillip H. KING assumed command of the 9th Military Police Company. CPT Herman R. RICKER, the previous commander, departed for the Saigon Support Command.

f. On 5 May 1969, Major General Harris HOLLIS, Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, visited the 9th Military Police Company and presented awards for valor and achievement to 27 enlisted personnel and 2 officers. During the reporting period members of the 9th Military Police Company received 1 Soldiers medal, 7 ARCOMs for valor, 126 ARCOMs for service or achievement, 2 BS for valor, 23 BS for service or achievement and 1 Purple Heart.

g. On 7 May 1969, the Division CMI Team conducted an inspection of the 9th Military Police Company. The unit was given an overall rating of 78% and determined as satisfactory.

h. On 1 June 1969, LTC Raymond D. WOOD replaced LTC Philip L. ASH as 9th Division Provost Marshal.

i. The International Committee of the Red Cross inspected the 9th Division Detainee Collection Point on 20 June 1969. No deficiencies were noted.

j. Major WILLIAMS joined the company on 30 June 1969 to replace Major MARXUACH.

k. The attached inclosures indicate the present organization and disposition of military police elements providing support to commanders.

(1) Inclosure 1 indicates the present organizational structure of the military police company.

(2) Inclosure 2 provides a roster of key personnel assigned to the 9th Military Police Company.

(3) Inclosure 3 graphically indicates the area police responsibility of the Provost Marshal and where military police elements were located to best support committed maneuver forces.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) For Period Ending 30 June 1969; (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WFDDA)(U)

2. ORGANIZATION: The 9th Military Police Company is currently organized under MTOE 19-27G, and includes a Provost Marshal Section, Company Headquarters, a Security Platoon and four Military Police Platoons. Previously, internal tailoring had created an additional fifth platoon, designed to provide security for DISCOM IC/P, MEDC/P and special selective enforcement missions.

a. The requirement for the field (fifth) platoon, described fully in the ORLL dated 1 May 1969, ceased operations during the latter portion of the reporting period when DISCOM IC/P and MEDC/P missions were reduced in preparation for redeployment and significant additional military police commitments were instituted. The personnel from the disbanded fifth platoon were absorbed into the four platoon concept of operation.

b. The authorized strength of the 9th Military Police Company is nine (9) officers, two (2) Warrant officers and 178 enlisted men. Actual strength on 30 June 1969 was 10 officers, 1 Warrant officer, and 215 enlisted men.

3. FUNCTIONS: The 9th Military Police Company continued to provide military police support to the Division as described in the previous Operational Reports. During the latter portion of the present reporting period, the Provost Marshal instituted a program of internal tailoring to accomplish commitments during redeployment. Several unique and effective programs had been planned prior to the end of the reporting period.

a. Customs: Extensive coordination was required to plan for military police customs supervision of unit equipment scheduled for shipment to Hawaii as part of the Division redeployment. In addition military police personnel will inspect all accompanied baggage one or two days prior to individuals departing for Hawaii or CONUS, as well as detailed hand baggage and personal searches immediately prior to the individual boarding his aircraft. A special customs section will be established to supervise as customs inspectors and furnish technical advice to commanders on all aspects of customs clearance. The use of amnesty boxes will be stressed.

b. In addition to the customs workload, all phases which may be concurrent, the military police will be prepared to register increasing numbers of war trophies caused by the two Brigades departing RVN.

c. Convoy commitments will increase due to the volume of equipment and vehicles being processed for redeployment to Hawaii.

d. Discipline law and order activities are to be stressed as the Division stand down goes into effect. Field troops will be brought to the Division Base Camp for unit stand down processing. The large troop concentration will require initiation of a carefully planned and executed selective enforcement program as well as Command and Provost Marshal emphasis on crime prevention.

e. Increased emphasis is being placed on the suppression of possession and use of marihuana as well as precluding importation of narcotics into Hawaii or CONUS.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) For Period Ending 30 June 1969; (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WFDDA)(U)

4. PERSONNEL: During the reporting period. The strength of the Military Police Company exceeded authorization, but commitments required full utilization. On 1 May 1969, nineteen (19) military police personnel were reassigned to other divisional units. During the reporting period, the company sustained no killed or wounded personnel due to combat operations.

5. POLICE INTELLIGENCE: There have been no significant changes in criminal activity within the Division area of operation from that reported in the ORLL for the period ending 30 April 1969.

6. SIGNIFICANT MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT:

a. Military police supported the maneuver elements daily in the conduct of Operations TOAN THANG (phase III), SPEEDY EXPRESS, RICE FARMER, KUDZU and QUET-CHIEN.

b. The 9th Military Police Company continued to fulfill the commitments in support of the 3d Brigade operation OVERWATCH in which military police provided convoy security on Highway QL# 4 from the outskirts of Saigon to Dong Tam. A total of 161 convoys were escorted without incident during the period.

c. The military police continued their rear area damage security missions during enemy mortar attacks. Military police personnel have been instrumental in locating numerous impact areas to enable shell reporting teams to obtain essential shell report data for counter-fire. In order to accomplish this mission military police continued to operate under fire. In addition to securing impact areas, military police facilitated damage control operations by exercising traffic control and rendering aid to injured personnel and in many instances, accomplished evacuation of the injured to medical facilities.

SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED; COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS,
EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL: None

2. OPERATIONS:

a. Main Gate Facilities.

(1) OBSERVATION: The Main Gate facilities were inadequate for proper processing of the 3500 Vietnamese civilian employees and hundreds of military and civilian vehicles entering and leaving Dong Tam each day.

(2) EVALUATION: A new gate building was constructed with sufficient pedestrians to permit a more detailed search of employees and expedite pass exchange. An additional access road was constructed on the West side of the gate house to permit segregation of military and civilian vehicular traffic, thereby easing the usual congestion during the peak hours.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: None

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) For Period Ending 30 June 1969; (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WVFDL)(U)

b. Offense rates:

(1) OBSERVATION: Division offense rates remained below the USAW average in all categories. However, periods of selective enforcement can quickly change this favorable posture in any of the offense categories on a weekly basis.

(2) EVALUATION: Continuing command emphasis, intensive troop education, and proper command action are required to maintain a low offense rate. Without these, selective enforcement only serves to raise and lower the offense rate with, producing little in the way of tangible results.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: A coordinated effort involving all aspects of the command is required to effectively reduce offense rates. In addition to the enforcement effort, which should be constant rather than sporadic, assistance in the maintenance of law and order should be sought from all General and Special Staff agencies as well as unit commanders. Formation of a type of disciplinary Control Council would be beneficial in this respect.

c. Physical Security Surveys:

(1) OBSERVATION: As indicated in the last ORLL a requirement exists for greatly increased emphasis in physical security matters.

(2) EVALUATION: Since the inception of the program 34 physical security surveys have been conducted. With the return of stricter supply accountability, much more needs to be done to ensure adequate protection for government property.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That a continuing, intensive and coordinated program of physical security and crime prevention surveys be pursued, to include increased emphasis on education.

d. Detainee Processing: Expedite disposition of detainees.

(1) OBSERVATION: Disposition of detainees is often unnecessarily prolonged because of administrative delay in processing of required paperwork.

(2) EVALUATION: Certain administrative steps are required by regulations before proper disposition can be made of a PW/Detainee. Routine administrative handling and normal distribution channels are not rapid enough to satisfy the time limits established by USARV and local provinces. This is especially true in the case of Civil Defendants, i.e., Long An Province will not accept a Civil Defendant that has been held in excess of 48 hours.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That negotiations be conducted with Long An Province to extend their limit of 48 hours to something more realistic. Additionally, that a standard operating procedure be established, designating internal routing of actions on detainees and establishing priorities in order to preclude administrative delays.

e. Hospitalized Detainees:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) For Period Ending 30 June 1969; (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WFED...)(U)

(1) OBSERVATION: The 3d Surgical Hospital located in Dong Tam periodically has hospitalized detainees requiring military police guard personnel. The unit designated to guard these prisoners is the 720th Military Police Battalion located in Long Binh. Due to the time-distance factor, the 9th Division Military Police have frequently been requested to furnish guard personnel until 18th Military Police Brigade guards arrive.

(2) EVALUATION: Reference letter dated 5 June 1969, request for assistance from Commanding Officer, 18th Military Police Brigade, 9th Division Military Police have assumed the responsibility of guarding detainees hospitalized in the 3d Surgical Hospital in Dong Tam when the prisoners arrive during the hours of darkness. The 9th Division Military Police guard hospitalized prisoners from the time they are admitted until guard personnel from the 18th Military Police Brigade arrive.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That this policy be adopted as standard practice since prisoners in medical channels are not common enough to justify the maintenance of full time guard detail from the supporting escort guard unit in the Division area.

f. Hospital Detainee Ward:

(1) OBSERVATION: The lack of a special prisoner ward in the 3d Surgical Hospital creates serious custodial and security problems and requires the use of excessive military police personnel resources.

(2) EVALUATION: Detainees being treated at medical facilities or evacuated through medical channels, presently share the same facilities as do U.S. personnel. They are frequently located in several different wards, intermingled with U.S. personnel. This frequently requires the use of several guards when one or two would suffice.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That a prison ward or isolation area be established to house all PW/Detainees for ease of handling and security.


Raymond D Wood

RAYMOND D. WOOD
LTC, MFC
Provost Marshal

3 Incl
as


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Special

9TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY ORGANIZATION



AVDE-PM
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTLY PERIOD ENDING 30 JUNE 1969; (RCS/
CSFOR-65)(UIC-WFDM)(U).

ENCLOSURE 1



ADDF-PM
 SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 30 June 1969
 1969; (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WPDAA)(U)
 19 July 1969